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Florida Law Review, Vol. 3, Iss. 3 [1950], Art. 7
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW
FELLOW-SERVANT RULE IN FLORIDA
Under an established common law rule, commonly referred to as
the respondeat superior doctrine,' a master is liable to third persons
for injuries caused by the negligence or misconduct of an employee
when acting within the scope of his employment. 2 The theory usually
advanced is that, since the master controls his servant's acts and
receives the attendant benefits, he should be liable for any wrongful
acts performed in his behalf. 3 The fellow-servant rule is one of three
common law defenses 4 available to the master to defeat recovery under
the respondeat superior doctrine; the others, assumption of risk 5 and
contributory negligence, 6 are not within the scope of this Note.
ORIGIN

The fellow-servant rule originated in the English case of Priestley
v. Fowler,7 in which Lord Abinger held that a fellow-servant's negligence is one of the risks assumed when a servant accepts employment.
Essentially the rule is but a part of the assumption of risk doctrine; 8
its extensive use, however, has caused it to be considered as a separate
defense by the courts.

1See, e.g., Mechem, Employer's Liability, 4 ILL. L. REV. 243, 249 (1909).
2E.g., Coon v. Syracuse & Utica R. R., 5 N.Y. 492 (1851); cf. Winn & Lovett
Groc. Co. v. Archer, 126 Fla. 308, 171 So. 214 (1936); Stinson v. Prevatt, 84 Fla.
416, 94 So. 656 (1922).
3E.g., Flike v. Boston & Albany R.R., 53 N.Y. 550 (1873). Mr. Justice Holmes
severely criticized the respondeat superior doctrine on the ground that it forces one
man to pay for another's wrongs. He suggested that the real reason for the doctrine
is the employer's deep pocket, Holmes, Agency, 5 HARv. L. REV. 1 (1891). The
doctrine, however, is not without support. See, e.g., Morris, The Torts of an Independent Contractor,29 ILL. L. REV. 339, 340 (1934).
4

See 1

MECHEm, LAw OF AGENCY

5

§§1643-1678 (2d ed. 1914).

See Wilson & Toomer Fertilizer Co. v. Lee, 90 Fla. 632, 106 So. 462 (1925).
6
See Atlas Dredging Co. v. Mitchell, 74 Fla. 307, 77 So. 542 (1917).
73 M. & W. 1, 150 Eng. Rep. 1030 (Ex. 1837). Plaintiff, a butcher boy's
helper, was injured as a result of the overloading of a van by the butcher boy.
Neither the plaintiff nor the defendant, his master, knew of the overloading. In a
civil suit for damages the court held that the master was not liable, since a servant
is not bound to risk his safety in an employer's service and may avoid risks by
refusing to accept employment in which he apprehends injury.
8Indeed, the Priestley case is also cited as the origin of the defense of assump-

tion of risk, 3
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NOTES

Briefly stated, the fellow-servant rule provides that a master is not
liable to a servant injured as the result of a co-servant's negligence,
even though he would be liable under similar circumstances to a third
person not his servant. South Carolina 9 and Massachusetts, 10 the first
American jurisdictions to adopt this defense, were but the forerunners;
today Florida"" and most other jurisdictions in the United States 12
recognize the rule as a limitation to the respondeat superior doctrine.
JUDGE-MADE ExCMnoNS

In order to minimize the hardships resulting from close adherence to
14
the fellow-servant rule, several courts,' 3 following Ohio's lead,
15
adopted the vice-principal exception. In the leading Ohio case an
engineer was allowed to recover from a railroad for injuries caused by
the negligence of the conductor. The court advanced the idea that,
since the conductor was a supervisor carrying out the acts of the
master, he was not a fellow-servant of the engineer. Other persons in
charge of carrying out the master's work, as well as train conductors,
have been called vice-principals, with the result that the injured ser16
vant was allowed to recover from his master.
9

Murray v. South Carolina R.R., 11 S.C. 166 (1841).
'0Farwell v. Boston & Worcester R.R. Corp., 4 Metc. 49, 38 Am. Dec. 339

(Mass. 1842).

"IParrish
v. Pensacola & Adt. R.R., 28 Fla. 251, 9 So. 696 (1891).
2

1 E.g., Nolan v. New York, N.H. & H. R.R., 70 Conn. 159, 39 Adt. 115 (1898);
Kerr v. Crown Cotton Mills, 105 Ga. 510, 31 S.E. 166 (1898); Zienke v. Northern
Pac. By., 8 Idaho 54, 66 Pac. 828 (1901); Stewart v. International Paper Co., 96
Me. 30, 51 At. 237 (1901); Hunn v. Michigan Cent. R.R., 78 Mich. 513, 44 N.W.
502 (1889); Hawk v. McLeod Lumber Co., 166 Mo. 121, 65 S.W. 1022 (1901);
Molihoff v. Chicago, R.I. & P. R.R., 15 Okla. 540, 82 Pac. 733 (1905); Duncan v.
A. & P. Roberts Co., 194 Pa. St. 563, 45 At. 330 (1900).
13 Collier v. Tennessee Coal Co., 155 Ala. 375, 46 So. 487 (1908); Allen v.
Standard Box & Lumber Co., 53 Ore. 10, 96 Pac. 1109 (1908); Reese v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel Co., 243 Pa. St. 336, 90 At. 63 (1914).
24 Little Miami R.R. v. Stevens, 20 Ohio 415 (1851).
1'1bid.
16E.g., Day v. Chicago, M. & St. R.R., 284 IlL 534, 120 N.E. 480 (1918)
(person temporarily acting as foreman considered a vice-principal as to one of his
crew of carpenters); Wagner v. Gibsonite Constr. Co., 220 S.W. 890 (Mo. 1920)
(carpenter operating mechanical saw considered vice-principal as to a carpenter's
helper); Petroleum Iron Works Co. v. Burlington, 80 Qkla. 43, 193 Pac. 980
(1920) (department head vice-principal as to a mere laborer); Allen v. Chamberlain, 134 Tenn. 438, 183 S.W. 1034 (1916) (railroad section foreman considered vice-principal as to section hand).
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UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW
In an early Florida case 17 the Court defined a fellow servant as a
person who has the same common enterprise and who is attempting
to accomplish the same general purpose as the injured servant. Under
this broad definition the Court found that an engineer was a fellow
20
9
servant of a fireman, 18 a switchman,' and even a common laborer.
21
In Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co. v. Beazley, however, the Court
allowed a flagman injured as a result of the acts of the conductor to
recover from the railroad on the basis of the vice-principal exception.
And in the comparatively recent case of Crenshaw Bros. Produce Co.
v. Harper,22 a truck driver was considered a vice-principal in so far
as a student helper was concerned, and the latter was allowed to
recover. Mr. Justice Brown severely criticized the rationale of the
23
fellow-servant rule and urged that it be abolished altogether.
LEGISLATIVE

CHANGE

The Florida Legislature, recognizing that injustices were being
caused by the use of this defense, in 1887 enacted a statute 24 that
abrogated the fellow-servant rule in cases involving railroads. The
Florida Court in construing this statute has tended to restrict its
meaning despite the general criticism of the co-servant rule.2 5 In
Luster v. Geneva Mill Co., 26 for example, the Court held that a person
injured while operating a tramway in conjunction with a lumber
business was not operating a railroad as contemplated by the statute.
The fellow-servant rule was allowed as a defense, and the plaintiffemployee was denied recovery from the lumber company.
In 1918 the Legislature again limited the scope of the fellow17

Stearns & Culver Lumber Co. '.. Fowler, 58 Fla. 362, 50 So. 680 (1909).
18 South Florida R.R. v. Price, 32 Fla. 46, 13 So. 638 (1893).
39Prairie Pebble Phosphate Co. v. Taylor, 64 Fla. 403, 60 So. 114 (1912).
20
1ngram-Dekle Lumber Co. v. Geiger, 71 Fla, 390, 71 So. 552 (1916).
2154 Fla. 311, 45 So. 761 (1907).
22142 Fla. 27, 194 So. 353 (1940).
23 1d. at 47, 194 So. at 361.
24
FLA. STAT. §768.07 (1949). This statute was patterned upon the Georgia
statute and is typical of legislation passed in other states with regard to railroads,
1 MECHEM, LAW OF AGENCY §1679 (2d ed. 1914).
25
See, e.g., Steuer, The Fellow Servant Rule in New York, 6 FORD. L. REV. 361
(1937); 1 BAYLOR L. REV. 489 (1949). Professor Mechem notes that the rule
difficult
.s
to account for except upon considerations of expediency rather
than natural justice," 1 MECHEM, LAW OF AGENCY §1643 (2d ed. 1914).
26102 Fla. 350, 135 So. 854 (1931).
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NOTES
servant defense by providing in effect that it should not be available
if the injury occurred in certain types of employment. 27 The statute
sets out certain hazardous occupations 28 and expressly provides that
29
as to these occupations the assumption of risk doctrine is abrogated.
30
The Florida Court in Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co. v. Shouse
stated that the purpose of the statute is to restrict the scope of the
fellow-servant doctrine, and held that one employed in the enumerated
hazardous occupations did not assume the risk of a co-employee's
negligence.
Workmen's compensation statutes have also drastically restricted
the orbit of the fellow-servant rule. Legislation of this type was first
enacted in England,3 1 where the fellow-servant defense was likewise
first advanced. The protection that the English act gave to employees
was rendered almost nugatory, however, when the English courts
found that an employee could contract away rights given to him under
the statute.3 2 In America today, under similar statutes the employee
is denied the right to contract away such benefits, either by the terms
of the statute33 or by decisions that hold such contracts void as against
34
public policy.
The Florida Workmen's Compensation Law,3 5 passed in 1935,
applies to employers having more than three employees, and expressly
excepts farm laborers, domestic servants, casual employees, and many
others from coverage. 36 It provides for an election by the employee:
27

c. 769 (1949).
§769.01 (1949) reads as follows: "This chapter shall apply to
persons engaged in the following hazardous occupations in this state; namely, railroading, operating street railways, generating and selling electricity, telegraph and
telephone business, express business, blasting and dynamiting, operating automobiles for public use, boating, when boat is propelled by steam, gas or electricity."
29
FL.. STAT. §769.04 (1949).
3083 Fla. 156, 91 So. 90 (1922).
3143 & 44 Vicr. c. 42 (1880).
32
Griffiths v. Earl of Dudley, 9 Q.B.D. 857 (1882).
33
E.g., Anuz. CODE ANN. §56-806 (1939); Aim. STAT. ANN. tit. 81, §1320(a)
(1947);
Ox-A. STAT. ANN. tit. 85, §47 (1936).
34
Devise v. Delano, 272 Ill. 166, 111 N.E. 742 (1916); Pittsburg C.C. & St. L.
fy. v. Ross, 169 Ind. 3, 80 N.E. 845 (1907); Cannaday v. Atlantic C.L. R.R., 148
N.C. 439, 55 S.E. 836 (1906).
35Fr.. STAT. c. 440 (1949).
a0FL. STAT. §440.02(1) (1949): "...
officers elected at the polls ... professional athletes such as professional boxers and wrestlers, and baseball, football,
basketball, hockey, pole, tennis, jai alai and similar players excluding also all
F.A. STAT.
28FLA. STAT.
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He can either accept certain fixed compensation under the act or sue
under the common law.A7 When he brings his action at law, however,
the common law defenses, including the fellow-servant rule, are available to the employer.
CONCLUSION

Lord Abinger, in announcing the fellow-servant rule in Priestley v.
Fowler, admitted that he lacked judicial precedent; he nevertheless
sought to justify the rule enunciated by a process of inductive
3
reasoning: 8
"If the owner of the carriage is therefore responsible for the
sufficiency of his carriage to his servant, he is responsible for the
negligence of his coach-maker, or his harness-maker, or his coachman. The footman ...may have an action against his master
for a defect in the carriage owing to the negligence of the coachmaker, or for a defect in the harness, arising from the negligence
of the harness-maker, or for drunkenness, neglect, or want of skill
in the coachman ....The master, for example, would be liable
to the servant for the negligence of the chambermaid, for putting
him into a damp bed; for that of the upholsterer, for sending
in a crazy bedstead whereby he was made to fall down while
asleep and injure himself; for the negligence of the cook, in not
properly cleaning the copper vessels used in the kitchen: of the
butcher, in supplying the family with meat of a quality injurious
to the health; of the builder, for a defect in the foundation of the
house, whereby it fell, and injured both the master and the servant
by the ruins."
The supposed absurdity of the consequences led Lord Abinger to
decide against the servant. His logic, however, has been concisely and
39
effectively criticized:
referees, judges, umpires, trainers, masseurs and similar performers or attendants
incident to professional exhibitions and performance of athletic games, sports and
contests, turpentine labor, labor in processing gum-spirits of turpentine, crude gum,
oleorosin and gum rosin."
3 7
FLA. STAT. §440.07 (1949).
3
8Priestley v. Fowler, 3 M. & W. 1, 150 Eng. Rep. 1030, 1032 (Ex. 1837).
39
DOWNEY, HISTORY OF WORK ACCIDENT INDEMNITY IN IowA 239 (1912). See
note 25 supra for general criticisms of the fellow-servant doctrine.
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NOTES

"'Had the learned and antiquated Lord drawn his analogies from
the factories or steam railways then flourishing all about him, his
arguments might have seemed less conclusive even to himself."
Despite the fallacy of his reasoning Lord Abinger should not
be dealt with too severely. At the time he handed down the Priestley
decision the laissez faire doctrine was at its zenith as a result of the
Say, the great French
writings of Adam Smith and Jean Baptiste
40
teacher and exponent of Smith's theories.
In all probability the only reason that fragments of the rule remain
is that they seem of such little consequence. The fellow-servant defense in Florida, for example, can only be used against those who are
not covered by the Workmen's Compensation Law or who, although
covered, choose to bring a common law action rather than accept the
compensation allowed under the Act.41 The public policy of today as
manifested by workmen's compensation laws - that injuries caused by
industry be charged as a cost of production 42 - requires the complete
abolition of the rule. The fact that the defense is available in only a
few instances is not an adequate reason to retain a rule that, according
to most authorities, 4 3 is without any justification other than mere expediency. But, since the Florida Legislature has taken it upon itself
to limit the application of the rule without eliminating it altogether,
it is not for the judiciary to declare its dissolution. Until such time as
the members of the Legislature see fit to abolish the rule, the courts
of Florida can only apply the common law doctrine without regard to
possible injustices.
HARRY M. HOBBS

40Cf. CLR R, LAW OF THE EMmPLOYMENT OF LABOR c. 7 (1911);McCoNNELL,
BAsic TEcmNas OF Tm GREAT ECONONrrSTS 356, 357 (1943); USHER, INTRODUCTION TO THE INDUSTRIAL HisTORY OF ENcLAND 425 (1920).
41
See note 87 supra.

42

See General Properties Co. v. Greening, 154 Fla. 814, 820, 18 So.2d 908, 911

(1944); Protectu Awning Shutter Co. v. Cline, 154 Fla. 30, 36, 16 So.2d 342,

343 (1944).
43
See note 25 supra.
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